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Advertising Competition in Retail Markets∗
Kyle Bagwell and Gea M. Lee
Abstract
We consider non-price advertising by retail firms that are privately informed as to their re-
spective production costs. We construct an advertising equilibrium in which informed consumers
use an advertising search rule whereby they buy from the highest-advertising firm. Consumers
are rational in using the advertising search rule since the lowest-cost firm advertises the most and
also selects the lowest price. Even though the advertising equilibrium facilitates productive effi-
ciency, we establish conditions under which firms enjoy higher expected profit when advertising
is banned. Consumer welfare falls in this case, however. Under free entry, social surplus is higher
when advertising is allowed. In addition, we consider a benchmark model of price competition; we
provide comparative-statics results with respect to the number of informed consumers, the number
of firms and the distribution of costs; and we consider the possibility of sequential search.
KEYWORDS: advertising, regulation, private information, retail markets
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1 Introduction
The typical retail rm sells a large number of products. When a retail rm ad-
vertises using traditional media, such as radio, TV, billboards and magazines,
the rm may thus be unable to communicate substantial “hard” information
to its potential consumers. In particular, a retail rm that advertises using
such media may be able to communicate only limited information regarding
the prices of the large range of products that it carries. Retail advertising in
such media is often thus best described as “non-price” advertising.
The prevalence of non-price advertising in retail markets raises a number
of interesting questions. First, is non-price retail advertising consistent with
equilibrium behavior? Non-price advertising is costly, so rms use it only if
consumers respond. Since non-price advertising may have little or no hard
information, however, it is not clear why rational consumers would respond.
Second, would banning non-price retail advertising raise or reduce consumer
welfare? An answer to this question is necessary in order to evaluate the
appropriate public policy toward non-price advertising. Finally, do retail rms
have an incentive to encourage regulatory restrictions on non-price advertising?
An armative answer to this question, for example, would support the view
that restrictions on retail advertising may be a form of “regulatory capture.”
These questions are of particular interest in light of striking empirical re-
lationships between advertising and prices that have been identied in some
retail industries. The classic study is by Benham (1972). Examining transac-
tion prices in the retail eyeglass industry in the U.S. in the 1960s, he reports
that prices were higher in states that prohibited all advertising than in states
that had no restrictions on advertising; moreover, prices were only slightly
higher in states that allowed just non-price advertising than in states that also
allowed price advertising. Evidently, the ability to advertise, even if only in a
non-price form, is sometimes associated with lower prices. Cady (1976) docu-
ments similar relationships in the U.S. retail market for prescription drugs in
1970.1 At a broad level, this work raises the possibility that retail rms might
gain if they were able to limit advertising. An agreement to limit advertising
is directly achieved in the presence of a state law that prohibits advertising;
1Related ndings are reported in other studies which focus on dierent retail markets,
including the markets for gasoline, routine legal services and liquor. See Bagwell (2007,
Section 3.2.4) for a survey. Rizzo and Zeckhauser (1992) consider the market for physicians
and report evidence that advertising is associated with higher prices (and quality). As
they note, however, this market has several novel features: quality is dicult to assess,
consumers are highly sensitive to perceived quality, and consumers are relatively insensitive
to price (given third-party reimbursement).
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fessional association that imposes advertising restrictions on its members.2
Bagwell and Ramey (1994a) develop a complete-information model of retail
competition with which to interpret Benham’s ndings. In their model, some
consumers can identify the highest-advertising rm, while other consumers do
not observe advertising levels. The former (latter) consumers are referred to
as informed (uninformed) consumers. Each consumer possesses a downward-
sloping demand function and lacks direct information about rms’ prices: a
consumer observes a rm’s price only after choosing to visit that rm. Bagwell
and Ramey compare two equilibria. In a random equilibrium, consumers ig-
nore advertising and choose rms at random. Firms do not advertise, and they
enjoy symmetric market shares. By contrast, in an advertising equilibrium, the
informed consumers go to the rm that advertises the most. Firms then use
a symmetric mixed strategy, in which higher advertising choices are paired
with greater investments in cost reduction and thus lower prices. Informed
consumers are then rational in visiting the highest-advertising retailer, since
this retailer also oers the lowest price. For a given number of rms, expected
prot is higher in the random equilibrium, because advertising expenses are
thereby avoided. Bagwell and Ramey then include an initial entry stage so
as to endogenize the number of rms. Comparing free-entry advertising and
random equilibria, they show that, in the advertising equilibrium, the market
is more concentrated, prices are lower, and social welfare is higher. If the ran-
dom equilibrium is associated with a setting in which advertising is banned,
these ndings are broadly consistent with the empirical patterns that Benham
reports.
In this paper, we modify the Bagwell-Ramey model by assuming that each
rm has private information about its exogenous costs of production. Specif-
ically, we consider a model with a continuum of possible cost types, where
cost types are iid across rms. We then characterize an advertising equilib-
rium, in which rms use pure strategies and lower-cost rms advertise more
than do higher-cost rms. In the incomplete-information model that we an-
alyze here, informed consumers are rational in using the advertising search
rule, since the lowest-cost rm advertises the most and also selects the lowest
price. We also compare the advertising equilibrium with the random equi-
librium in which no rm advertises, both when the number of rms is xed
and when the number of rms is endogenous. We thereby consider the short-
and long-run implications of advertising competition for consumer surplus and
2The FTC has argued that anti-competitive eects may be associated with price and
non-price advertising restrictions imposed by a professional association. See California
Dental Association v. Federal Trade Commission (1999). A further possibility is that
rms interact repeatedly and achieve a self-enforcing agreement to limit advertising. We
consider this latter possibility in our companion paper (Bagwell and Lee, 2010).
alternatively, retail rms might achieve such an agreement by forming a pro-
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rm prot. In addition, we analyze a benchmark model of price competition;
we provide comparative-statics results with respect to the number of informed
consumers, the number of rms and the distribution of costs; and we consider
the possibility of sequential search.
At a broad level, we can interpret our model as a “puried” version of
the Bagwell-Ramey model. In fact, our analysis explores two notions of pu-
rication. Our rst notion reects the traditional view of purication under
which the mixed-strategy equilibrium of a complete-information game can be
interpreted in terms of the pure-strategy equilibrium of a nearby incomplete-
information game. For the special case in which the support of possible costs is
small, we report that the distribution of advertising levels in the pure-strategy
advertising equilibrium of the incomplete-information game is approximately
the same as the distribution of advertising levels in the mixed-strategy adver-
tising equilibrium of the associated complete-information game.3 Correspond-
ingly, we show that the main predictions of Bagwell and Ramey directly ex-
tend to the private-information setting, if the support of possible costs is su-
ciently small. Under our second notion of purication, we consider whether the
main predictions are robust across equilibria for the complete- and incomplete-
information games, even when these games are not nearby to one another. For
the general case in which the support of possible cost types may be large, we
establish conditions under which the main predictions derived in the complete-
information game emerge as well in the incomplete-information game. This
second notion of purication sometimes requires additional structure on the
distribution and demand functions.
We develop our results while allowing for the general case of a large sup-
port of possible cost types. As mentioned, we establish that an advertising
equilibrium exists, in which lower-cost rms advertise more and price lower
than do higher-cost rms. We then establish four additional results. First, for
any given number of rms, expected consumer surplus is higher in the adver-
tising equilibrium than in the random equilibrium. Intuitively, in our model,
the distribution of posted prices is not aected by rms’ ability to engage in
non-price advertising; thus, uninformed consumers are indierent between the
advertising and random equilibria.4 At the same time, non-price advertising
enables informed consumers to locate the rm with the lowest cost and thus
3Bagwell and Ramey (1992, 1994a) report a similar nding when the cost of advertising
is private information and varies slightly across rms. We also note that the associated
complete-information game that we consider here is closely related to but distinct from
that considered by Bagwell and Ramey. An important dierence is that we do not allow scale
economies achieved through endogenous investments in cost reduction.
4The prediction of an invariant distribution for posted prices is special to our model.
It holds since we assume that costs are exogenous and exhibit constant returns to scale.
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the lowest price; hence, the average transaction price is lower when non-price
advertising is allowed. This rst result is consistent with Benham’s observation
and holds independently of any assumption about the distribution of types or
the elasticity of demand.
Second, for any given number of rms, if the distribution of types is log-
concave and demand is suciently inelastic, then rms earn higher expected
prot in the random than in the advertising equilibrium. When the number
of rms is xed, therefore, rms and informed consumers rank the advertis-
ing and random equilibria in opposite fashion. Intuitively, in comparison to
the advertising equilibrium, the random equilibrium oers rms an advan-
tage as well as a disadvantage. The advantage of the random equilibrium is
that rms avoid the expenses that are associated with advertising competi-
tion. The disadvantage of the random equilibrium is that it assigns the same
market share to all rms, whereas the advertising equilibrium achieves greater
productive eciency by assigning higher expected market shares to lower-cost
rms. Building on techniques used by Athey et al. (2004) in their study of
price collusion, we show that the random equilibrium’s advantage overwhelms
its disadvantage, if the distribution of types is log-concave and demand is suf-
ciently inelastic.5 Our second result thus gives conditions under which rms
have an incentive, at least in the short run, to seek regulatory restrictions on
advertising.
The third result follows directly from the second: when the number of rms
is endogenously determined by a free-entry condition, if the distribution of
types is log-concave and demand is suciently inelastic, more rms enter when
the random equilibrium is anticipated. Thus, advertising competition leads to
a more concentrated market structure.
Finally, our fourth result concerns social welfare when the number of rms is
endogenously determined. Under free entry, rms are indierent between the
advertising and random equilibria, since in each setting the number of rms
adjusts until each rm earns zero prot. Whether social surplus is higher in
the advertising or random equilibrium thus hinges entirely on the consumer
surplus that is expected in each equilibrium. In fact, our rst result may be
easily extended to cover settings in which dierent numbers of rms enter
in the advertising and random equilibria, respectively. Without making any
assumption on the distribution of types or the elasticity of demand, we show
that social surplus is weakly higher in the advertising than in the random
5Athey et al. (2004) establish related conditions under which optimal collusion for sellers
in a rst-price procurement auction entails pooling at the buyer’s reservation value. See
also McAfee and McMillan (1992) for a related theory of identical bidding among collusive
bidders in a rst-price auction. Our model of advertising, by contrast, is analogous to
an all-pay auction.
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equilibrium when the number of rms is endogenous; moreover, social surplus
is strictly higher in the advertising equilibrium if at least two rms enter in
that equilibrium.
As noted, Bagwell and Ramey (1994a) also construct an advertising equilib-
rium, nd that rms earn greater short-run prot in the random equilibrium,
and nd that the advertising equilibrium leads to a more concentrated market
structure and greater social welfare in the long run. Our second, third and
fourth results above thus establish a sense in which Bagwell and Ramey’s main
predictions extend to the private-information setting. We emphasize, however,
that the second and third results now employ additional assumptions on the
distribution of types and the elasticity of demand. These additional assump-
tions arise because of the productive-eciency advantage that the advertising
equilibrium oers in our incomplete-information setting.
We also compare the advertising equilibrium with another benchmark. In
particular, we follow Varian (1980) and suppose that informed consumers ob-
serve prices and buy from the lowest-priced rm while uninformed consumers
pick a rm at random. Following Spulber (1995) and Bagwell and Wolinsky
(2002), we modify Varian’s model and allow that rms are privately informed
about their production costs.6 Let us refer to the (symmetric) equilibrium of
this game as the pricing equilibrium. For any xed number of rms, we show
that rms earn higher expected prot in the pricing equilibrium than in the
advertising equilibrium. This is perhaps surprising, since competition in adver-
tising is sometimes argued to be less aggressive than competition in prices. As
we discuss, the key intuition is that price competition induces greater in-store
demand from consumers and thus elevates the size of expected information
rents for rms.
With an analysis of the benchmark model in place, we are able to oer
a more complete comparison across dierent advertising regulatory regimes.
Provided that the market always has at least two rms, our results indicate
that the average transaction price is lowest in the pricing equilibrium, some-
what higher in the advertising equilibrium, and higher yet in the random
equilibrium. Likewise, when the number of rms is endogenous, social welfare
is highest in the pricing equilibrium, somewhat lower in the advertising equi-
librium, and lower yet in the random equilibrium. If we associate the pricing
equilibrium with a setting in which price advertising is allowed, the advertising
equilibrium with a setting in which only non-price advertising is allowed, and
the random equilibrium with a setting in which all advertising is banned, then
our results are broadly consistent with Benham’s ndings.
6Bagwell and Wolinsky follow Varian and assume that each consumer possesses an inelas-
tic demand function. We generalize this analysis slightly and allow for downward-sloping de-
mand functions. Spulber considers a related model in which all consumers are informed.
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We next examine the comparative-statics properties of the advertising equi-
librium. When the number of informed consumers is increased, advertising
increases for all types other than the highest type. Intuitively, rms adver-
tise more heavily when the “prize” from advertising the most is increased.7
Interestingly, the eect on advertising of an increase in the number of rms
depends on a rm’s cost type: lower-cost rms compete more aggressively and
increase their advertising, but higher-cost rms perceive a reduced chance of
winning the informed consumers and advertise less. An implication is that the
support of observed advertising levels may be larger in markets with a greater
number of rms. We also nd that, for all types other than the lowest type,
if the number of rms is suciently large, the equilibrium level of advertising
is negligible. Finally, building on Hopkins and Korneinko’s (2007) analysis of
all-pay auctions, we show that, if the cost distribution shifts to make lower-
cost types more likely in the sense of the monotone likelihood ratio order, then
lower-cost rms advertise more while higher-cost rms become discouraged
and advertise less.8
We next modify the game to allow for sequential search. If demand is
suciently inelastic or if the cost of sequential search is suciently high, then
our results are maintained without modication. If these conditions do not
hold, however, then higher-cost rms must “limit price” (i.e., price below
their monopoly prices), in order to deter sequential search.9 An advertising
equilibrium then continues to exist, if the support of possible cost types is
not too large and the number of informed consumers is not too great. In this
equilibrium, informed consumers use observed advertising behavior to locate
the lowest price, and limit pricing by higher-cost rms ensures that uninformed
consumers do not gain from actually undertaking sequential search. We argue
as well that the possibility of sequential search may even strengthen our results,
by raising the relative protability of the random equilibrium.
Other authors have also considered the eects of advertising regulations on
the conduct of rms that are privately informed as to their respective costs
of production. For example, Peters (1984) and LeBlanc (1998) consider the
eects of a prohibition on price advertising in models with a xed number of
rms where each rm is privately informed about its production cost. By con-
trast, here we emphasize the eects of a prohibition on non-price advertising,
7Bagwell and Ramey (1994a) report a related nding for their complete-information
model.
8This nding contrasts interestingly with the standard monotone comparative statics
result for rst-price auctions. See, for example, Athey (2002) and Lebrun (1998).
9Our analysis here builds on Reinganum (1979) and Bagwell and Ramey (1996). Rein-
ganum examines sequential search in a model with privately informed rms that are not al-
lowed to advertise. Bagwell and Ramey examine sequential search when advertising is al-
lowed but private information is absent.
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and we utilize a free-entry condition to endogenize the number of rms. Also,
Bagwell and Ramey (1994b) consider a duopoly model in which one rm has
private information as to whether its costs are high or low. For settings in
which non-price advertising is legal, they show that non-price advertising may
be used to signal low costs and thus low prices. In the current paper, by con-
trast, we adopt a continuum-type model, assume that all rms are privately
informed as to their costs, endogenize the number of rms using a free-entry
condition, and report (non-monotone) comparative statics results.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 denes the advertising game
and contains our main ndings. In Section 3, we present a benchmark model of
price competition. Our comparative-statics results are found in Section 4. We
consider the possibility of sequential search in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Remaining proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Advertising Game
In this section, we dene an advertising game in which a xed number of rms
compete through advertising for market share. Firms are privately informed
as to their respective costs, and each rm’s advertising choice may signal its
costs, and thus its price, to those consumers who are informed of advertising
activities. We establish the existence of an advertising equilibrium, in which
informed consumers visit the rm with the highest level of advertising. We
compare the expected prot earned by rms in the advertising equilibrium
with that which they earn in a random equilibrium, wherein all consumers
pick rms at random. We also compare expected consumer surplus in the
advertising and random equilibria. We then endogenize the number of rms
and compare market concentration and social welfare across the two equilibria.
2.1 The Model
We assume   2 ex ante identical rms compete for sales in a homogeneous-
good market. Each rm  is privately informed of its unit cost level  Cost
levels are iid across rms, and cost type  is drawn from the support [ ]
according to the twice-continuously dierentiable distribution function,  (),
where     0 The density 	()   0() is positive on [ ] As discussed
in further detail below, after rms learn their respective cost types, they si-
multaneously choose their prices and levels of advertising. Following Bagwell
and Ramey (1994a), we assume that advertising is a dissipative expense that
does not directly aect consumer demand.
The rms face a unit mass of consumers, where each consumer possesses a
twice-continuously dierentiable demand function 
() that satises 
() 
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0  
0() over the relevant range of prices . We assume that price information
cannot be directly communicated in this market; thus, consumers cannot ob-
serve prices prior to selecting a rm to visit and from which to purchase. Some
consumers, however, do observe advertising activity prior to picking a rm. In
particular, a fraction  of consumers are informed, in the sense that they
observe rms’ advertising expenses.10 Given this information, informed con-
sumers form beliefs as to rms’ cost types and determine a visitation (search)
strategy. For example, informed consumers may use an advertising search rule,
whereby a consumer goes to the rm that advertises the most.11 The remain-
ing fraction  = 1  are uninformed. Uninformed consumers do not observe
advertising expenditures and thus may adopt a random search rule, whereby
a consumer randomly chooses which rm to visit.
The interaction between rms and consumers is represented by the follow-
ing advertising game: (i) rms learn their own cost types, (ii) rms make
simultaneous choices of advertising and price, and (iii) given any advertis-
ing information, each consumer chooses a rm to visit, observes that rm’s
price and makes desired purchases given this price. Note that a consumer is
assumed to visit only one rm.12 As we explain below, this assumption simpli-
es our analysis, by ensuring that each rm chooses the monopoly price that
is associated with its cost type for any sales that it makes.
We are interested in Perfect Bayesian Equilibria for the advertising game.
Before formally dening our equilibrium concept, however, we impose two re-
quirements. First, we focus on equilibria in which consumers do not condition
their visitation decisions on rms’ “names.” Thus, uninformed consumers must
use the random search rule; furthermore, for any given vector of advertising
levels, informed consumers must treat symmetrically any two rms which ad-
vertise at the same level. Informed consumers hence satisfy this restriction
if they use the random or advertising search rules.13 Second, we focus on
equilibria in which rms use symmetric advertising and pricing strategies. We
note that the random search rule is indeed an optimal search strategy for
uninformed consumers, when rms use symmetric pricing strategies.
Given symmetry, we can dene a pure advertising strategy for rm  as a
function () that maps from the set of cost types [ ] to the set of possible
10We assume that informed consumers observe advertising levels for simplicity. All of
our results hold under the assumption that informed consumers observe only the identity
of the highest-advertising rm(s).
11If several rms tie for the highest advertising level, then the informed consumers divide up
evenly over those rms.
12We extend the analysis to allow for sequential search in Section 5.
13Under the random search rule, consumers randomly pick a rm from the set of all
rms. Similarly, under the advertising search rule, informed consumers randomize over
all rms that advertise at the highest level (if more than one such rm exists).
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advertising expenditures R+  [0). Consider now rms other than rm
. Let A() denote the vector of these rms’ selections when their cost
types are given by the (  1)-tuple . Given the search rule used by
informed consumers, the market share for rm  is determined by the vector
of advertising levels selected by rm  and its rivals. The market share for
rm  thus maps from R+ to [0 1] and in equilibrium may be represented
as (()A()).14 Note that, under our rst requirement above, rm ’s
market share is not indexed by  and thus does not depend on rm ’s name.
If rm  has cost type , its interim-stage market share under these strategies
is [(()A())]
We next describe rm ’s expected prot. Firm ’s net revenue is ( ) 
()
() (excluding advertising expenses) when it has cost type , sets the
price  and captures the entire unit mass of consumers. We assume that ( )
is strictly concave in  with a unique maximizer () = argmax ( ) It fol-
lows that the monopoly price () strictly increases in  whereas (() )
strictly decreases in  We further assume that the price at the top has a
positive margin: ()  . Given our requirement that all consumers, and
particularly uninformed consumers, treat all rms symmetrically, we know
that all rms receive positive expected market share. Therefore, in the equi-
libria upon which we focus, each rm must select the monopoly price given
its cost type. Embedding the monopoly price into the revenue function,
we may dene the interim-stage net revenue for rm  by (() ;) 
(() ) [(()A())]. Thus, (() ;) is the interim-stage
net revenue for rm  when rm  has cost type , advertises at level (),
and anticipates that other rms also use the advertising function  to deter-
mine their respective advertising levels upon observing their cost types. Firm
’s expected revenue is (() ;) and rm ’s expected prot is thus
[(() ;)()].
Given our embedded requirements, we may now dene an equilibrium as
an advertising strategy , a belief function and search rules for consumers
that collectively satisfy three remaining conditions. First, given the market
share function, , that is induced by consumers’ search rules, the advertising
strategy  is such that, for all  and  ()  argmax [( ;) ].15
Second, given an observed advertising level  by rm , informed consumers
14For example, if all consumers use the random search rule, then (()A()) =
1 . If instead the uninformed consumers use the random search rule while the informed
consumers use the advertising search rule, then (()A()) =  + 	 if () 

() for all  6= , while (()A()) = 	 if ()  () for some  6= .
For this latter set of consumer search strategies, if rm  ties with   1 other rms for
the highest advertising level, then (()A()) =  + 	 .
15Notice that () must be an optimal choice for rm  with cost type  in comparison
to advertising deviations that are “on-schedule” (i.e.,  such that  = () 6= ()
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use Bayes’ Rule whenever possible (i.e., whenever  = () for some  
[ ]) in forming their beliefs as to rm 0s cost type  and thus price ().
Third, for any observed vector of advertising levels [1   ]  R+ , given
their beliefs, informed consumers’ search rule directs them to the rm or rms
with the lowest expected price.
We may now simplify our notation for equilibrium variables somewhat fur-
ther. We may dene rm ’s interim-stage market share as (();) 
 [(()A())]  Similarly, we can dene rm ’s interim-stage prot
and net revenue as follows:
(() ;)  (() )(();)()
 (() ;)()
We note that the interim-stage prot function satises a single-crossing prop-
erty: higher types are less willing to engage in higher advertising to increase
expected market share.16 For here and later use, we now write interim-stage
prot in direct-form notation, ignoring subscript : if a rm of type  picks
an advertising level (b) when its rivals employ the strategy  then we
dene (b ;)  ((b) ;) (b;)  ((b);) and (b ;) 
((b) ;)
We are primarily interested in two kinds of equilibria. In an advertising
equilibrium, informed consumers use the advertising search rule. Since () is
strictly increasing, such equilibria can exist only if the advertising schedule is
nonincreasing, so that higher-advertising rms have lower costs and thus oer
lower prices. In a random equilibrium, informed consumers ignore advertising
and use the random search rule. A random equilibrium thus can exist only if
rms maximize expected prots and do not advertise (i.e.,   0)
2.2 Advertising Equilibrium
In an advertising equilibrium, informed consumers use the advertising search
rule while uninformed consumers are randomly distributed across all  rms.
We now report the following existence and uniqueness result.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique advertising equilibrium, and in this
equilibrium() is strictly decreasing and dierentiable and satises () = 0.
for some   [ ]) as well as “o-schedule” (i.e.,  such that  6= () for any   [ ]).
16When a rm increases its advertising level, it may confront a trade o between the larger
advertising expense, , and the consequent higher expected market share, (;)When
the interim-stage prot is held constant, the slope (;) is given by (() )
which is strictly decreasing in 
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Proof. We rst derive the necessary features of an advertising equilibrium.
The following incentive constraints are necessary: For any   [ ] and anyb  [ ],
((b)b)(b;)(b)  ((b)b)(;)()
(() )(;)()  (() )(b;)(b)
Adding yields [((b)b) (() )][(b;)(;)]  0 Since (() )
is strictly decreasing in  it is thus necessary that (;) is nonincreasing.
It follows from the incentive constraints that () is nonincreasing. Further,
given the advertising search rule, it is clear that () cannot be constant over
any interval of types: by increasing its advertising an innitesimal amount, a
rmwith a type on this interval would experience a discrete gain in its expected
market share. Thus, () must be strictly decreasing, and consequently it is
necessary that(;) = 

+[1 ()]1 It follows that(;) = 

. A
rm with type  thus cannot be deterred from selecting zero advertising, and
hence () = 0 is also necessary.
We next establish that () must be dierentiable, and we also derive the
necessary expression for 0() Consider any b   Rearranging the incentive
constraints presented above, we nd that
(() )[(b;)(;)]b    (
b)()b    ((
b)b)[(b;)(;)]b   
Similarly, consider any b  . The incentive constraints may now be re-
arranged to yield
(() )[(b;)(;)]b    (
b)()b    ((
b)b)[(b;)(;)]b   
Allowing that b may approach  from the right or the left, we may now take
limits as b   use the dierentiability of the function (;) = 

+ [1 
 ()]1, and conclude that
0() = (() )
(;)


When combined with the boundary condition () = 0 this dierential equa-
tion may be solved to yield
() = 
Z 

(() )[(;)]
where 	(
;)


= (  1)[1  ()]2	()  0 for all   
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We now integrate by parts and establish that () must take the following
unique form:
() = ( ;)( ;)
Z 


(())



+ [1  ()]1
¸
 (1)
where ( ;) = (() )

 Rearranging, we note that interim-stage prot
for type  then must be given as
( ;) = ( ;) +
Z 


(())



+ [1  ()]1
¸
 (2)
Observe that interim-stage prot is positive for all   [ ]
The second step in our proof is to construct an advertising equilibrium using
the () function dened in (1). Observe that 1( ;) = (() )
	(;)


0() = 0 when this function is used. It follows that no type  will deviate by
mimicking some other type b, since for all b   we have
( ;)(b ;) = Z 

1( ;)
=
Z 

[1( ;)1( ;)] 
=
Z 

Z 


12( ;)  0
where the inequality follows from
12( ;) = 
(())(  1)[1  ()]2	()  0 for all   
A similar argument ensures that ( ;)  (b ;) for all b   Next, if
no type    gains from deviating to (), then a deviation to any advertising
level   () is also unattractive. Finally, since 0()  0 the advertising
search rule is optimal for informed consumers. ¥
Proposition 1 thus establishes the existence and uniqueness of an advertising
equilibrium.17 The advertising equilibrium acts as a fully sorting (separating)
17See Maskin and Riley (1984) for a related equilibrium characterization of bidding func-
tions in the context of optimal auctions when buyers are risk averse. Our model also en-
dogenizes the beliefs and strategies of informed consumers. For an advertising equilib-
rium, beliefs are uniquely dened on the equilibrium path (by Bayes’ rule) and o the equi-
librium path (since the advertising search rule is optimal for informed consumers when
they observe an advertising level in excess of () only if they believe that the devi-
ating rm has cost type ).
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mechanism: rms truthfully reveal their cost types along the downward-sloping
advertising schedule. The informed consumers behave rationally in the adver-
tising model: the lowest-cost rm advertises the most and oers the lowest
price, and the informed consumers purchase from the highest-advertising rm.
Thus, ostensibly uninformative advertising directs market share to the lowest-
cost supplier and promotes productive eciency.
In the advertising equilibrium, the expected market share allocated to a
rm of type  takes the following form: (;) = 

+[1 ()]1 A rm
is sure to get its share of uninformed consumers; further, since the advertising
schedule is downward sloping, a rm wins the informed consumers with the
probability that the other   1 rms draw higher types. The advertising
equilibrium thus induces a market share allocation that is strictly decreasing
in a rm’s type. The highest type does not advertise and sells only to its
uninformed consumers: (;) = 

.
We now characterize the expected prot for rms in the advertising equi-
librium. Using (2) and integrating by parts, we nd that expected prot may
be represented as:
 [( ;)] = (() )


+


(())

	
()



+ [1  ()]1
¸¸

(3)
The rst term on the RHS is the “prot at the top.” As noted, the fully sorting
scheme allocates a market share of only 

to the highest type, . The second
term represents the expected information rents. It is not immediately clear
whether a strictly decreasing market share allocation enhances the magnitude
of this term. The strength of the fully sorting scheme is based on downward-
sloping demand. Lower-cost rms set lower prices and thus generate greater
demand from visiting consumers; hence, 
(()) is decreasing in . By di-
recting more market share to lower-cost rms, the fully sorting scheme thus
acts to expand the size of the market and increase expected information rents.
The weakness of the fully sorting scheme is associated with the term 

() For
many popular distributions,  is log-concave (

() is nondecreasing in ).18
By allocating less market share to higher types, the fully sorting scheme works
against the direct to which log-concavity of  appeals.
Log-concavity of  plays a prominent role in our analysis below. It is
thus important to develop some intuition for the role played by this prop-
erty.19 Market share must be allocated so as to satisfy incentive compatibility.
When greater market share is directed to type , this type earns greater prot
18This assumption is common in the contract literature and is satised by many dis-
tribution functions.
19For further discussion, see also Athey et al. (2004).
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and is thus less tempted to mimic lower types. Lower types can then lower
advertising expenses and earn greater prot without inducing a violation of
incentive compatibility. Intuitively, the ratio 

() describes the contribution
to expected prot that is made when type  receives greater market share,
since this ratio measures the proportion of types below  conditional on the
occurrence of type . When 

() is nondecreasing in , an increase in market
share to type  contributes more to expected prot when type  is higher.20
The advertising equilibrium can be understood as a purication of Bagwell
and Ramey (1994a). In their paper, advertising directs market share to the
rm that oers the best deals, but equilibrium advertising takes the form of a
mixed strategy. To see how our model constructs a puried version, consider
a complete-information game, where production costs are xed at a constant
  0 Then, as we establish in the Appendix, there exists a unique symmet-
ric mixed-strategy equilibrium in this game as in Bagwell and Ramey (1994a)
and Varian (1980).21 Consider next an incomplete-information game, where
production costs rise in types  As we show in the Appendix, if a rm of type
 uses the advertising strategy () in the unique advertising equilibrium of
the incomplete-information game, then the probability distribution induced by
 is approximately the same as the distribution of advertising in the mixed-
strategy equilibrium of the complete-information game, when the production
costs for types  (say, ()) approximate the constant 22 This purication
result oers a useful link between the complete- and incomplete-information
analyses; however, it does not establish whether the main predictions of Bag-
well and Ramey carry over when, as seems plausible, production costs vary
signicantly with types. As we show below, when some additional structure
is placed on the demand and distribution functions, the main predictions of
the complete-information model can be captured in the general incomplete-
information setting.
20We build on this intuition below, when we compare expected information rents under the
advertising and random equilibria. The random equilibrium is a limiting case in which
rms pool at zero advertising. The resulting market share allocation is incentive compatible.
21In the complete-information game considered here, all rms set the same price and in-
formed consumers are indierent when using the advertising search rule. By contrast, Bag-
well and Ramey (1994a) allow rms to make cost-reducing investments, and this ensures that
higher-advertising rms oer strictly lower prices. In the analysis of advertising equi-
libria considered here, the advertising search rule is strictly optimal for informed con-
sumers provided that incomplete information is present so that production costs vary (at
least a little) with types.
22Our analysis here builds on Bagwell and Ramey (1992, 1994a), who establish a related
nding when the cost of advertising is private information and approximately constant.
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2.3 Random Equilibrium
In this subsection, we analyze the random equilibrium, wherein all consumers
use the random search rule and thus divide up evenly across rms. Each
rm then receives an equal share, 1

, of the unit mass of consumers. Given
the random search rule, rms necessarily choose zero advertising, since even
informed consumers are unresponsive to advertising; furthermore, when rms
pool and do not advertise, the random search rule is a best response for each
consumer.23 The random equilibrium thus exists and takes the form of a
pooling equilibrium.
In the random equilibrium, the interim-stage prot for the rm of type  is
given by (() ) 1

 The random equilibrium sacrices productive eciency;
however, all advertising expenses are avoided. Using (())

= 
(()) it
is straightforward to conrm that the expected prot for a rm in the random
equilibrium is


(() )
1

¸
= (() )
1

+


(())

	
()
1

¸
 (4)
The RHS contains the prot at the top and the expected information rents,
respectively.
2.4 Comparison of Advertising and Random Equilibria
We now compare the advertising and random equilibria. We begin by com-
paring the expected consumer surplus in these equilibria. An uninformed
consumer expects the same consumer surplus whether the advertising or ran-
dom equilibrium is anticipated. For both equilibria, the uninformed consumers
samples from the induced distribution of monopoly prices and expects to pay
 [()]. By contrast, an informed consumer expects strictly higher consumer
surplus in the advertising equilibrium than in the random equilibrium. The key
point is that, in the advertising equilibrium, an informed consumer can infer
the identity of the lowest-cost, and thus lowest-price, rm. Accordingly, while
23If informed consumers observe a deviation whereby some rm selects positive advertising,
then random search remains optimal in the event that informed consumers believe that the
deviating rm has an average type. Since such a deviation may be more attractive to a lower-
cost type, the random equilibrium may fail to be a “rened” equilibrium in the static model.
See Bagwell and Ramey (1994b) for an analysis of the rened equilibrium in a related model
of advertising in which one rm has two possible cost types. As noted in the Introduction, the
random equilibrium can also be associated with a setting in which advertising is prohibited
(in which case deviant positive advertising selections are not possible). Our analysis here of
random equilibria is also useful for our companion paper (Bagwell and Lee, 2010), where
we consider the repeated game and the possibility of a self-enforcing agreement among
rms in which a deviation from zero advertising would cause a future advertising war.
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the distribution of prices is not altered across equilibria, the informed consumer
in the advertising equilibrium transacts at the lowest available price. Formally,
an informed consumer expects to pay  [()] in the random equilibrium and
[(min)], where min  min{1  }, in the advertising equilibrium. Un-
der our assumption that   2, we have that [(min)]   [()].
The comparison of expected prot across equilibria is more subtle. As
illustrated in (3) and (4), in both types of equilibria, expected prot consists
of two terms: the prot at the top and the expected information rents. To
increase the prot at the top, the random equilibrium (pooling) is strictly
preferred to the advertising equilibrium (full sorting). Intuitively, the highest-
cost rm is never “out-advertised” in the random equilibrium and thus sells to
its share of all consumers, 1

; by contrast, in the advertising equilibrium, the
highest-cost rm is always out-advertised and thus sells only to its share of
uninformed consumers, 

. To increase expected information rents, however,
it is not immediately clear whether the random or advertising equilibrium
is preferred. On the one hand, if 

() is nondecreasing, then the random
equilibrium is attractive, since this equilibrium allocates more market share
to higher-cost types. On the other hand, downward-sloping demand creates
a force that favors the advertising equilibrium, which allocates more market
share to lower-cost types, since these types price lower and thus generate larger
demand 
(())
For the special case in which the support of possible cost types is small,
we can unambiguously rank expected prots under the advertising and ran-
dom equilibria. As    approaches zero, expected information rents also
approach zero in both the advertising and random equilibria. Prot at the
top remains strictly higher under the random equilibrium, however, since the
highest-cost rm gets strictly more market share in the random than the adver-
tising equilibrium. Thus, for   suciently small, expected prot is strictly
higher under the random equilibrium than under the advertising equilibrium.
Given the purication result described above and established in the Appendix,
this nding can be understood as a direct extension of Bagwell and Ramey’s
(1994a) analogous nding for the associated complete-information game.
Consider next the general case in which the support of possible costs may
be large. To go further in ranking expected prots, we must formally ana-
lyze the expected information rents.24 Let  denote the advertising schedule
used in the advertising equilibrium, in which the market share allocation,
(;) = 

+ [1   ()]1 is strictly decreasing. Similarly, let   0
denote the advertising schedule used in the random (pooling) equilibrium, in
24Our analysis here builds on arguments made by Athey et al. (2004) in their analysis
of price collusion.
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the distribution function
(;) 
R 

(;)	()R 

(;)	()

The distribution (;) is similarly dened. The denominator represents
the (ex ante) expected market share, which equals 1

 Since(;) is strictly
decreasing, (;) = 1

crosses (;) from below This implies in turn
that(;) rst-order stochastically dominates(;): (;)  (;)
Thus, if 
(())

() is nondecreasing, thenZ 


(())

	
() (;) 
Z 


(())

	
() (;) 
The inequality can be rewritten as



(())

	
()(;)
¸
 


(())

	
()(;)
¸
 (5)
Referring to (3)-(5), we conclude that, if 
(())

() is nondecreasing, then
expected information rents are weakly higher in the random equilibrium than
in the advertising equilibrium. In fact, given our assumption that 	()  0,
we can go further and establish that, if 
(())

() is nondecreasing, then the
random equilibrium must generate strictly higher information rents than the
advertising equilibrium. This follows since 
(())

() is strictly increasing
at , given 	()  0
We may now summarize our ndings regarding the comparison of expected
prot across equilibria. Relative to the advertising equilibrium, the random
equilibrium has strictly higher prot at the top and, if 
(())

() is non-
decreasing, strictly higher expected information rents. As suggested above,

(())

() is nondecreasing if the log-concavity of  is signicant in com-
parison to the extent to which demand slopes down. Further insight is possible
by considering the limiting case in which 
(()) is perfectly inelastic, so that

(()) is constant for all prices up to a reservation value. In this case, if  ()
is log-concave, then 
(())

() is nondecreasing.
We may now state the following conclusion:
Proposition 2. (i) Informed consumers enjoy strictly higher expected con-
sumer surplus in the advertising equilibrium than in the random equilibrium,
and uninformed consumers enjoy exactly the same expected consumer surplus
in both equilibria. (ii) If  is log-concave and demand is suciently inelas-
which the market share allocation, (;)  1

 is constant. We now dene
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make a strictly higher expected prot in the random equilibrium than in the
advertising equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (i) captures the implications of advertising restrictions for
consumer welfare. While the ability to advertise does not aect the distribu-
tion of posted prices, it does lead to a strict reduction in the average transaction
price. This nding is consistent with Benham’s observations. We discuss this
point further in the next subsection, when we allow for endogenous entry.
Proposition 2 (ii) indicates that important circumstances exist under which
rms gain when the use of advertising is restricted. As our discussion of
the random equilibrium conrms, advertising would not be used if informed
consumers were to ignore it. If informed consumers were responsive to ad-
vertising, however, then rms might nevertheless achieve a restriction on the
use of advertising if advertising were legally prohibited. For a xed industry
structure, Proposition 2 (ii) thus suggests that retail rms might benet from
a prohibition on non-price retail advertising.25
Proposition 2 (ii) establishes that rms gain by restricting the use of adver-
tising if  is log-concave and demand is suciently inelastic or if the support
of possible cost types is suciently small.26 It is important to note, though,
that this conclusion may hold even when the assumptions are weakened. Con-
sider the constant-elasticity demand function, 
() =  and suppose that
demand is elastic (i.e.,   1) Assume further that  is log-concave in the spe-
cic sense that types are distributed uniformly over [ ] where   0 For this
example, calculations reveal that 

[
(())

()]  0 for all  if [ ]  
Firms thus earn a strictly higher expected prot by pooling at zero advertising
than by following the advertising equilibrium, provided that the elasticity of
demand,  does not exceed a critical level where this level is higher when the
support of possible cost types is smaller.
25A further possibility is that rms are able to eliminate the use of advertising through
a self-enforcing collusive agreement and that rms prefer such a restriction to any other
self-enforcing advertising scheme. We consider this possibility in our companion paper
(Bagwell and Lee, 2010).
26Under these conditions, rms prefer the random equilibrium to the advertising equi-
librium, because separation through advertising is too costly as a means of informing con-
sumers of rms’ cost types. Information transmission itself would be valuable to rms
if it could be achieved at lower cost. For example, rms would earn even higher ex-
pected prot if they could costlessly and veriably tell informed consumers the identity of
the lowest-cost rm, since rms would then enjoy productive eciency without incur-
ring any advertising expenditures. See Ziv (1993) for an analysis of a similar issue in the con-
text of oligopoly information sharing.
tic, or if the support of possible cost types is suciently small, then rms
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2.5 Free-Entry Equilibrium
We now relax the assumption that the number of rms is xed. To this end,
following Bagwell and Ramey (1994a), we include now an initial stage for
the game in which rms simultaneously decide whether to enter, where entry
entails a positive setup (or opportunity) cost. After a rm chooses to enter,
it privately learns its cost type. The number of entering rms is publicly
observed, and the game then proceeds as above.
It is clear from (3) and (4) that expected prot is strictly decreasing in
the number of rms,  whether rms anticipate the advertising or random
equilibrium. Thus, in each case, an equilibrium number of rms is implied
such that the prot from entry (inclusive of the xed cost) would be negative
were one more rm to enter. Let denote the equilibrium number of entering
rms when the advertising (full sorting) equilibrium is anticipated, and let 
denote the equilibrium number of entering rms when the random (pooling)
equilibrium is expected. It is also clear from Proposition 2 that, if  is log-
concave and demand is suciently inelastic, or if    is suciently small,
then    Under these conditions, at least as many rms enter when
the random equilibrium is expected as when the advertising equilibrium is
anticipated.
The model also leads to welfare comparisons. Assume that min( ) 
127 When the number of rms is endogenized, if we ignore integer constraints,
then rms earn zero expected prot whether the random or advertising equilib-
rium is anticipated. Uninformed consumers are also indierent. Under either
equilibrium, an uninformed consumer picks a rm at random and thus faces
an expected price of () Finally, consider the informed consumers. When
the random equilibrium occurs, an informed consumer also faces an expected
price of (); however, when the advertising equilibrium occurs, an informed
consumer is guided by advertising activity to the lowest market price and thus
faces the expected minimum price in the market. Provided that   2 an
informed consumer thus strictly prefers the advertising equilibrium. When the
number of rms is endogenous, it follows that expected welfare is higher when
the advertising equilibrium is anticipated than when the random equilibrium is
expected. This conclusion does not require any assumption as to the elasticity
of demand or the log-concavity of the distribution function.
We may now summarize with the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Assume that min( )  1. (i) If  is log-concave
and demand is suciently inelastic, or if the support of possible cost types
is suciently small, then    (concentration is at least as high in the
27When  = 1 a single rm enters the market and chooses  = 0 and all consumers
visit it.
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advertising equilibrium as in the random equilibrium). (ii) Social surplus is
as high in the advertising equilibrium as in the random equilibrium; further,
if   2 then social surplus is strictly higher in the advertising equilibrium
than in the random equilibrium.
Allowing that the support of possible costs may be large, we thus establish
a sense in which Bagwell and Ramey’s main ndings extend to the private-
information setting. When legal or other considerations lead to the absence
of advertising, if the distribution of types is log-concave and demand is su-
ciently inelastic, then the market is less concentrated than it would be were
advertising competition to occur. Furthermore, the average transaction price
is lower, and social welfare is thus higher, when entry is endogenized and rms
compete in advertising. Note, however, that some ndings such as Proposition
2 (ii) and Proposition 3 (i) are not straightforward, given downward-sloping de-
mand. For a given number of rms, pooling at zero advertising acts to increase
the prot at the top but sorting through advertising acts to increase expected
information rents when demand is substantially larger for lower prices. This
conict suggests that market concentration could be lower in the advertising
equilibrium than in the random equilibrium, when demand is suciently elas-
tic. Thus, the established positive association between advertising and market
concentration employs additional assumptions on the distribution of types and
the elasticity of demand in the general private-information setting.
It is interesting to compare these ndings with empirical patterns empha-
sized in the earlier literature on advertising. Benham (1972) provides evidence
for retail markets that prices are lower and market concentration is higher,
when non-price retail advertising is allowed. Our ndings oer theoretical sup-
port for these associations. In another set of studies, Bain (1956), Comanor
and Wilson (1974) and others nd a positive relationship between manufac-
turer advertising and protability. These authors suggest that the relationship
may reect the role of advertising in deterring entry. Consistent with interpre-
tations oered by Demsetz (1973) and Nelson (1974), our work suggests that
advertising and protability may be positively related, since they are both
implications of superior eciency. In the advertising equilibrium, lower-cost
rms advertise more, have larger sales and earn greater expected prot.28
28While (interim) expected prot is decreasing in cost, ex post prot need not decrease in
cost. For 	 suciently small and   , ex post prot increases in cost among those
rms that do not have the lowest cost in the market. This is because such “losing” rms make
few sales when 	 is small and incur lower advertising expenses when costs are higher.
Thus, in some circumstances, higher ex post prot may be paired with lower advertising for a
subset of rms. We thank a referee for this observation. Note that, under our assumption
that demand is not perfectly inelastic, sales decrease with cost even in an ex post sense,
because higher-cost rms select higher prices.
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3 Comparison with Pricing Equilibrium
In this section, we compare the advertising equilibrium with the analogous
pricing equilibrium that emerges in a benchmark model in which   2 ex
ante identical rms compete in prices. We follow Varian (1980) and suppose
that informed consumers observe prices and buy from the lowest-priced rm
while uninformed consumers pick a rm at random. Following Spulber (1995)
and Bagwell and Wolinsky (2002), we modify Varian’s model and allow that
rms are privately informed as to their costs. We characterize the pricing
equilibrium of this benchmark game and compare the associated expected
prot with that achieved in the advertising equilibrium of our advertising
game.
In the benchmark game, if a pricing strategy is denoted by  then the
interim-stage prot in direct form is given by
(b ; ) = [(b) ]
((b))(b; )
where we use the superscript  to denote the benchmark (Bertrand) game.
When a rm selects the price (b) and other rms use the pricing strategy
 then the rm’s expected market share is denoted as (b; ) The prot-
if-win is dened by [(b)  ]
((b))  ((b) ) As in Spulber (1995), a
unique and symmetric equilibrium can be established. A new feature in our
benchmark model is that uninformed consumers exist. The pricing equilibrium
 satises:
0() = (() )[
(; )]
(() ) (; )
and () = () (6)
where (; ) = 

+ [1   ()]1. Straightforward arguments ensure
that the equilibrium price is lower than the monopoly price except the price
at the top, so that   0 As (6) conrms, the equilibrium pricing schedule
is strictly increasing; thus, rms are fully sorted by their types in the pricing
equilibrium. Notice that the highest-cost rm selects its monopoly price, ()
and sells only to uninformed consumers.
In the pricing equilibrium, interim-stage prot can be written as
( ; ) = ( ; ) +
Z 


(())



+ [1  ()]1
¸
 (7)
where the prot at the top is ( ; ) = (() )

 Integrating by parts,
we nd that expected prot is given as:

£
( ; )
¤
= (() )


+


(())

	
()



+ [1  ()]1
¸¸

(8)
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Comparing (8) with (3), we see that the prot at the top is the same in
the advertising equilibrium as in the pricing equilibrium. In each case, the
highest-cost rm monopolizes only uninformed consumers. The expected in-
formation rents are higher in the pricing equilibrium, however, since demand
is greater when prices are set below monopoly levels. We thus have the fol-
lowing conclusion: for any xed number of rms, a rm’s expected prot is
strictly higher in the pricing equilibrium than in the advertising equilibrium.29
Evidently, when rms possess private information about their costs, competi-
tion in (non-price) advertising is more aggressive than (Bertrand) competition
in prices. Intuitively, price competition induces greater in-store demand from
consumers and thus elevates the size of expected information rents for rms.
When the number of rms is xed, both consumers and rms agree that the
pricing equilibrium is preferred to the advertising equilibrium. When the num-
ber of rms is endogenized by the free-entry condition, more rms enter in the
former equilibrium than in the latter equilibrium. Once market structure is
endogenized, rms are indierent between pricing and advertising competi-
tion, but consumers strictly prefer the former to the latter (provided that at
least two rms enter in the pricing equilibrium).
We may thus summarize the ndings of this section as follows:
Proposition 4. There exists a unique and symmetric pricing equilibrium, and
in this equilibrium the pricing function () satises ()   and is strictly
increasing and dierentiable. Expected prot and consumer surplus are both
strictly higher in the pricing equilibrium than in the advertising equilibrium.
When the number of rms is endogenized, at least as many rms enter in the
pricing equilibrium as in the advertising equilibrium; furthermore, if at least
two rms enter in the pricing equilibrium, then social surplus is strictly higher
in the pricing equilibrium than in the advertising equilibrium.
With these ndings at hand, we may now oer a further interpretation of
Benham’s ndings. Let us associate the advertising equilibrium with a setting
in which only non-price advertising is allowed, the pricing equilibrium with a
setting in which price advertising is allowed, and the random equilibrium with
a setting in which advertising is banned.30 Provided that the market always
29In a dierent context, Bagwell and Ramey (1988) present a somewhat related nd-
ing. Working with a two-type signaling model, they show that a low-cost incumbent
earns greater prot when it separates using price as a signal than when it separates us-
ing wasteful advertising (money-burning) as a signal.
30Our association of the pricing equilibrium with a setting in which price advertising is
allowed implicitly assumes that price advertising is not costly and that rms do not choose
the intensity of price advertising. It would be interesting to explore as well a model of
price advertising that relaxes these assumptions. We leave this to future research.
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has at least two rms, our results in this section indicate that the average
transaction price is lowest when price advertising is allowed, somewhat higher
when only non-price advertising is allowed, and higher yet when all advertising
is banned. Likewise, when the number of rms is endogenous, social welfare
is highest when price advertising is allowed, somewhat lower when only non-
price advertising is allowed, and lower yet when all advertising is banned.
Finally, when demand is suciently inelastic and the distribution of types is
log-concave, the market is less concentrated when advertising is banned than
when non-price or price advertising is allowed.31 These ndings are broadly
consistent with Benham’s ndings.
4 Comparative Statics
We now return to the advertising model and conduct comparative-statics
analysis. We consider how the advertising equilibrium responds to changes
in parameters  and  and to shifts of the distribution function of types.
To analyze comparative statics associated with distribution functions, we
consider distribution functions  and  that have the same support [ ]
As above, the distribution functions are twice-continuously dierentiable and
have positive densities 	 and  We then compare two advertising equilibrium
strategies,  () and () that correspond to the distribution functions,
 and  respectively. We compare the distributions  and  by using the
monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) orderThe distribution function  dominates
 in terms of the MLR order if ()
()
is strictly increasing for all   [ ]. Using
the MLR order, we can show how rms choose their advertising when lower-
cost (higher-advertising) types are more likely under  than under 
Our comparative-statics results are contained in the following proposition:
Proposition 5. (i) Equilibrium advertising () is strictly increasing in 
for all   [ ), where () = 0 (ii) If  rises, then there exists b 
( 1(1  ! 11 )) such that equilibrium advertising strictly increases for
  [b), strictly decreases for   (b ), and is unchanged for   {b } (iii)
For all    and "  0, there exists  0 such that, for all    0, ()  ".
(iv) If distribution function  dominates  in terms of the MLR order, then
31For a xed number of rms, if demand is perfectly inelastic, the expected information
rents in the pricing equilibrium are the same as in the advertising equilibrium. Thus, when
demand is suciently inelastic, market concentration is approximately the same in these
two equilibria. Further, if  is suciently small, then the market is less concentrated when
advertising is banned than when non-price or price advertising is allowed. This is because the
random equilibrium generates the largest market share for a rm with cost type .
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there exists e  ( ) such that  ()  () for   [e)  ()  ()
for   (e ), and  () = () for   {e }.
The proofs of parts (ii) and (iv) are in the Appendix.
Using the derivation of () in the proof of Proposition 1, we can immedi-
ately conrm that part (i) holds.32 Intuitively, rms compete more intensely
by raising advertising when the gain from capturing informed consumers rises.
It is less clear, however, whether advertising increases when  rises. On the
one hand, an increase in the number of rms may lead to greater competi-
tion for the informed consumers and thus an increase in advertising. On the
other hand, an increase in the number of rms may also cause rms to become
discouraged about the prospect of winning the informed consumers and thus
result in a decrease in advertising. In part (ii), we conrm that these competing
considerations weigh dierently across rms with dierent cost types: when
the number of rms increases, lower-cost rms compete more aggressively and
raise advertising, while higher-cost rms perceive a reduced chance of winning
the informed consumers and lower advertising. An interesting implication is
that the support of equilibrium advertising levels (i.e., [() = 0 ()]) is
larger in markets with more rms. Observe, however, that as the number of
rms goes to innity, the cuto type b converges to ; thus, for markets with
a suciently large number of rms, further entry is almost sure to lower the
advertising of any given rm. In fact, we can easily conrm that part (iii)
holds and thus that, for any type other than the lowest type, the equilibrium
level of advertising must be near zero when the number of rms is suciently
large.33
Finally, as part (iv) establishes, competing considerations arise as well when
the distribution of costs changes so that lower-cost realizations become more
likely in the sense of the MLR order. Following such a shift, lower-cost rms
compete more aggressively for informed consumers and thus increase their ad-
vertising; however, higher-cost rms become discouraged about their chances
of winning the informed consumers and thus lower their advertising levels.
Our work here builds on Hopkins and Kornienko (2007), who report a similar
nding for a family of all-pay auctions.
5 Sequential Search
In the advertising model considered above, we assume that consumers are
unable to engage in sequential search. We now examine equilibrium behavior
32Formally, this follows since (;) is strictly decreasing in  for all   .
33As shown in the proof of Proposition 1, () = 0 and 0() = (() )(;).
Part (iii) thus follows, since, for all  
 , (;) goes to zero as  goes to innity.
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when this assumption is relaxed. Thus, we allow that after a consumer visits
a rm and observes that rm’s price, the consumer may elect to incur a search
cost and visit another rm.
Consider then a modied advertising game, in which consumers can under-
take costly sequential search and rms choose advertising levels and prices. A
Symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium may be informally dened in terms
of the following requirements: (i) each rm selects its advertising level and
price to maximize its expected prot, given its type and the strategies of other
players; (ii) each consumer selects an initial rm to visit and any subsequent
rm to visit in a way that maximizes the consumer’s expected welfare at each
point, given the information that the consumer then has and the consumer’s
beliefs about prices at rms not yet visited; (iii) where possible, consumers’
beliefs are formed in a manner consistent with Bayes’ rule, given the equilib-
rium strategies of rms;34 and (iv) rms use symmetric price and advertising
strategies. An advertising equilibrium is a Symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium in which informed consumers pick an initial rm using the advertising
search rule while uninformed consumers pick an initial rm at random. A
random equilibrium is a Symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which all
consumers ignore advertising and select an initial rm at random.
We begin by observing that the sequential-search option is irrelevant if the
cost of sequential search is suciently large relative to the expected dispersion
of prices in the market. Suppose that rms follow the advertising equilibrium
of the original advertising game as characterized in Proposition 1. An un-
informed consumer is then most tempted to search again in the event that
the consumer encounters the highest possible monopoly price, () Let ()
denote consumer surplus at the price  and let the cost of sequential search
be denoted as   0.35 Even a consumer that encounters () won’t gain from
sequential search, if (())  (()) . Thus, if ()() is small
relative to the cost of sequential search, then an uninformed consumer never
gains from sequential search. This condition is sure to hold in the limiting case
of perfectly inelastic demand, since then the monopoly price is independent
of production costs. Likewise, for the constant-elasticity demand function,

() =  with elasticity   1, we have that ()  () = 1 [  ].
Thus, if the extent of dispersion in production costs is small relative to the
34The concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium also includes a no-signaling-what-you-don’t-
know requirement. In the present context, this means that, if a consumer initially visits
rm  and contemplates undertaking the sequential search cost and visiting some other
rm , then the consumer’s belief about the price that might be observed at rm  is
not altered by the price observed at rm . Of course, for an informed consumer, the
belief about the price at rm  may be inuenced by the advertising level selected by rm 
35For simplicity, we assume that the initial search has zero cost.
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size of the sequential-search cost, then uninformed consumers will not search
again even after encountering the highest monopoly price.
If instead the cost of sequential search is small relative to the expected
dispersion of prices, then higher-cost rms induce search if they select their
monopoly prices. To capture this case, we assume henceforth that (()) 
(()) Building on work by Reinganum (1979) and Bagwell and Ramey
(1996), our goal is to establish conditions under which an advertising equilib-
rium exists in which rms with cost types at or above a critical level   ( )
select the monopoly price for this critical type. We thus seek to construct
an advertising equilibrium in which a rm with cost type    prices at
()  (), where () is determined so that the costs and benets of se-
quential search are equal. Higher-cost rms then “limit price” and thereby
deter uninformed consumers from searching again.
In our proposed advertising equilibrium, a rm of cost type  thus selects
the price ()  min{() ()} and earns the corresponding net revenue
(() ) We now impose a new assumption that ()   This assumption
is sure to hold if the dispersion in cost types is not too great or if demand is
suciently inelastic, and it ensures that ()   so that (() ) remains
strictly positive even for the highest type. Observe also that (() ) is
strictly decreasing with (
())

= 
(())  0 With these properties in
place, we can conrm that the arguments used in the proof of Proposition 1
continue to hold when rms use the pricing function () Thus, the level
of advertising again strictly declines as costs increase, and no rm of any
type gains from undertaking an “on-schedule” deviation and mimicking the
advertising level of some other type. Informed consumers are again rational in
visiting the rm with the highest advertising level, since this rm selects the
lowest price in the market.36 Two issues remain. First, we must establish that
a critical value   ( ) indeed exists such that an uninformed consumer is
indierent to sequential search upon observing () Second, we must establish
that no rm with cost type    would gain from undertaking an “o-
schedule” deviation to a higher price.
Consider the rst issue. Under our assumption that (())  (())
, it is straightforward to establish that there exists a unique value   ( )
such that
(()) = [1  ()](()) +
Z 

(()) ()  (9)
The LHS of (9) represents the consumer welfare from remaining with a rm
that selects ()while the RHS represents the expected welfare from incurring
36Note, though, that informed consumers are indierent about using the advertising search
rule in the event that all rms draw cost types at or above 
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the sequential-search cost  and nding the same price or a lower price. The
critical value   ( ) is then determined so as to make the consumer indif-
ferent between the two options Notice that  is independent of the fraction of
informed consumers, , and is strictly increasing in the sequential-search cost,
. As  gets close to zero,  gets close to  and thus almost all types select
the limit price.
To understand the second issue, consider a rm with cost type   
This rm retains its uninformed consumers if it sets the limit price, ()
and loses its uninformed consumers if it sets any higher price. Under our
assumption that ()   we know that the rm earns strictly positive net
revenue on its uninformed consumers at the price () Thus, as regards its
uninformed consumers, the rm earns strictly more by selecting the price ()
than it would make by undertaking an o-schedule deviation to any higher
price. But this rm must also consider informed consumers. With probability
[1  ()]1, this rm advertises more than all other rms and receives the
informed consumers. In this event, as in the model analyzed by Bagwell and
Ramey (1996), the informed consumers observe all advertising choices and thus
know that all other rms have higher costs and thus select the price () The
informed consumers will then tolerate a price hike without searching again,
provided that the hike is not too large. The maximal price hike that informed
consumers will tolerate is #() where #() is dened by (() + #()) 
(())   It follows that the optimal o-schedule deviation for a rm of
type    is the price (  )  min{() () + #()} where  is
determined as a function of  by (9).
We may now conclude that a rm with cost type    does not gain from
an o-schedule deviation to a higher price if
(  )  [(1 ())1][((  ) ) (() )] 

(() )  0
(10)
The rst term on the RHS of (10) captures the possible benet of a price hike
in terms of more protable sales to informed consumers whereas the second
term reects the certain cost of a price hike in terms of lost sales to uninformed
consumers. Notice that (  )  0, since (  ) = (). Likewise,
(  )  0 follows, since the highest-cost rm wins the informed consumers
with probability zero and earns strictly positive net revenue at the price ()
under our assumption that ()   Outside of these boundary cases, we can-
not immediately sign (  )We can, however, state the following sucient
condition: There exists   (0 1) such that if    then for all   ( )
(  )  0. In other words, if the fraction of informed consumers is not too
great, then no type of rm will undertake an o-schedule deviation by raising
price.
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We may now summarize our ndings as follows.
Proposition 6. Consider the advertising game, modied to allow for sequen-
tial search. Assume that the search cost satises (())  (()) and
that ()   There exists   (0 1) such that if    then an advertising
equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium, (i) rms use an advertising strategy
() that is strictly decreasing and dierentiable and satises () = 0; (ii)
rms use the pricing strategy () where   ( ) satises (9); and (iii)
consumers do not engage in sequential search along the equilibrium path.
In eect, Proposition 6 establishes conditions under which Proposition 1 ex-
tends to the setting in which sequential search is possible and not prohibitively
expensive.37
We now consider the eect of sequential search on the comparison between
expected prots under the random and advertising equilibria. When sequen-
tial search is possible, our assumption that ()   ensures that a random
equilibrium exists, wherein rms use the modied pricing schedule, ()38 As
this assumption implies that prot at the top is strictly positive, the random
equilibrium again generates strictly greater prot at the top than does the
constructed advertising equilibrium (when it exists). When sequential search
is prohibited, expected information rents are strictly higher under the random
than advertising equilibrium if 

()
(()) is nondecreasing. Likewise, when
sequential search is possible, expected information rents are strictly higher un-
der the random than advertising equilibrium if 

()
(()) is nondecreasing.
Since () is constant in  for    log-concavity of  alone now ensures
that 

()
(()) is nondecreasing when    Thus, the tension between
log-concavity and reduced demand is removed for higher types when sequential
search is possible. In this respect, the possibility of sequential search serves
to strengthen our basic result that rms achieve higher expected prot when
they restrict the use of advertising.39
37The advertising equilibrium of the modied static game is also unique, if the den-
itions of the advertising and random search rules are extended to cover sequential search deci-
sions. Otherwise, some uninformed consumers that encounter the price () may un-
dertake sequential search out of indierence, for example.
38The existence of the random equilibrium does not require any additional assumption
on the fraction of informed consumers, since rms do not advertise in the random equilibrium
and thus all consumers are, in eect, uninformed. Thus, the random equilibrium is the
counterpart of the equilibrium featured by Reinganum (1979).
39Note, though, that sequential search lowers prot at the top, since higher-cost rms
earn lower prot when sequential search is possible. Sequential search thus diminishes the
magnitude of the prot-at-the-top advantage that the random equilibrium has in comparison
to the advertising equilibrium.
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6 Conclusion
We investigate the advertising behavior of rms with private information as
to their respective production costs. We show that an advertising equilibrium
exists, in which informed consumers use an advertising search rule whereby
they buy from the highest-advertising rm. The key point is that the highest-
advertising rm has the lowest cost and thus selects the lowest price. In this
way, “non-informative” advertising directs consumers to the lowest price in
the market. We establish conditions under which rms earn greater expected
prot when advertising is banned. Consumer welfare falls in this case, however.
Thus, advertising can promote productive eciency and raise consumer wel-
fare; however, rms often have incentive to diminish advertising competition
through regulatory restrictions.
We also consider three extensions of the model. First, we present a bench-
mark model in which privately informed rms compete in prices for informed
consumers, and we argue that the associated pricing equilibrium generates
greater prot and consumer welfare than does the advertising equilibrium. Sec-
ond, we show that the advertising equilibrium exhibits non-monotone compar-
ative statics: when the number of rms increases, or when the lower-cost rms
become more likely in the sense of the monotone-likelihood ratio, lower-cost
rms advertise more while higher-cost rms become discouraged and advertise
less. Third, we modify the advertising model to allow for sequential search,
and we establish conditions under which an advertising equilibrium continues
to exist in the modied model.
We close by mentioning one example of a further extension that represents
a promising direction for future research. In our model, advertising expenses
are incurred prior to the realization of sales, and so rms implicitly rely on
retained earnings or external capital markets when incurring advertising ex-
penditures. Further, if the number of uninformed consumers is small, then it is
possible that a rm may not make sucient prot to cover its advertising ex-
penditure in the current period. These considerations provide motivation for a
model in which each rm’s advertising expenditure is capped at some common
level. Gavious, Moldavanu and Sela (2002) consider a related contest model.
Their results suggest the possibility of an advertising equilibrium in which the
advertising function is discontinuous, intermediate types advertise more when
a cap is in place, and all but the highest types advertise at the capped level
and thus pool. Interesting future work might build on this analysis, in order to
consider the eects of an advertising cap on expected advertising expenditures
and social welfare.
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7 Appendix
This appendix has two parts. In support of the discussion at the end of Section
2.2, the rst part denes a complete-information game, characterizes the asso-
ciated symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium, and shows that the distribution
of advertising in this equilibrium is approximately the same as that which
is induced by the pure-strategy advertising equilibrium of the incomplete-
information game when production costs vary suciently little with respect
to types. The second part completes the proof of Proposition 5.
7.1 Purication
7.1.1 Equilibrium in Complete-Information Game
Suppose that  rms sell a homogeneous good at a constant cost   0 A
pure strategy for rm  is   [0 (() )] and  denotes the (1)-tuple
of advertising selected by other rms. The prot for rm  is
( ) =


(() )

 if   max 6=
(() )
£


+ 

¤ if   max 6= andk{$ |  = }k = %  1
The term (() ) represents [() ]
(()) A mixed strategy for rm  is
a distribution function  over [() ()] The prot for rm  is
() =
Z 

· · ·
Z 

( )1 · · ·  
where  and  are dened below. This complete-information game has a
unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium,  =  for all  which is char-
acterized as follows:
Lemma A1. (i) There is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. (ii) There is a
unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium:
() =
μ

(() )
¶ 1
1
with () = 0 and () = (() ) (A1)
Proof. To prove (i), assume that there are % rms that select the highest
advertising  First, suppose that 2  %   If   (() ) then a rm
can gain by raising  slightly by " and winning all the informed consumers:
(() )



+ 
¸
 "  (() )



+

%
¸

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If  = (() ) then a rm can increase its prot by reducing  to zero and
winning only the uninformed consumers:
(() )


 (() )



+

%
¸

Second, suppose that % = 1 The highest-advertising rm can raise its prot
by setting  " which is slightly above the second-highest advertising.
To prove (ii), we begin by showing that any symmetric Nash equilibrium,
 must satisfy (A1). To this end, we establish four ndings. First, there is no
mass point in  If  is a mass point of  then there is a positive probability
of tie at  A rm can increase its prot, if it preserves the hypothesized equi-
librium strategy, except that it replaces the selection of  with the selection
of  + " for small " Second, () = 0 Suppose that ()  0 If a rm
chooses () then it wins only the uninformed consumers with probability
one, since ties occur with zero probability (because of no mass point). The
rm can increase its prot when it replaces the selection of [() () + "]
with the selection of zero advertising. Third, () = (() ) This result
is immediate, since the prot at the top is equal to the prot at the bottom
in the mixed-strategy equilibrium:
(() )



+ 
¸
(&) = (() )


Fourth,  is strictly increasing over (() ()) Suppose that there is a gap
(1 2) such that ()  1  2  () and (1) = (2) Advertise-
ments in the interval (1 2) are then selected with zero probability. For "
small, a rm would gain by replacing the selection of advertising levels in the
interval [2 2 + "] with the selection of 1 + " This deviation has the same
probability of winning but uses a lower level of advertising. Given these four
ndings, we may conclude that, in any symmetric Nash equilibrium,  and
for all   [0 (() )]
(() )



+ [()]1
¸
 = (() )

 (A2)
This equation yields (A1). Thus, (A1) is necessarily satised in a symmet-
ric Nash equilibrium. Observe next that (A1) identies a well-dened and
unique distribution function () Lastly, we verify that  is a Nash equilib-
rium. A rm earns the same expected prot for any   [() ()] when
all other   1 rms adopt () It cannot increase the prot by altering
the distribution over the interval. Any advertising above () earns a lower
expected prot than does () because () wins the informed consumers
with probability one. Any advertising below () is infeasible. ¥
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7.1.2 Equilibrium in Incomplete-Information Game
We consider an incomplete-information game, where production costs rise in
types  We argue that if each rm of type  chooses () which is the unique
advertising equilibrium in the incomplete-information game, then the probabil-
ity distribution induced by  is approximately the distribution of advertising
in the mixed-strategy equilibrium, when the payo relevance of types  gets
small. In the incomplete-information game, the rm of type   [ ] privately
observes its type and has the cost () Assume that function  is dierentiable
and strictly increasing in  with 0  ()  ()   where  is given by

() = 0 The advertising game is the same as in the text. Then, arguing
as in the proof of Proposition 1, there is a unique advertising equilibrium 
which satises:
0() = (() )(  1)[1  ()]2	()  0 and () = 0 (A3)
where (() ) = [(()) ()]
((()))
Lemma A2. Given a constant   (0 ) for any "  0 there exists '  0
such that if |() |  ' for all   [ ] then the probability distribu-
tion of advertising induced by the advertising equilibrium in the incomplete-
information game is "-close to  where  is the distribution of advertising
in the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the complete-information game with con-
stant cost 
Proof. The distribution induced by () is
() ( | ()  ) = () ¡  1()¢ = 1  ¡1()¢ 
Let  denote the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium with costs  Dene
the function  by
() = 
1
 (&()) where &()  1  ()
Given that &() is strictly decreasing in  and  is strictly increasing, ()
is strictly decreasing in  The proof is established as a consequence of the fol-
lowing results. First, if each rm of type  chooses () then the distribution
of advertising becomes  In other words, () induces the same distribution
of advertising as :
() (()  ) = ()
¡
1 (&())  
¢
= () (&()  ())
= () ( ()  1 ())
= ()
¡
  1(1 ())
¢
= 1  ¡1(1 ())¢
= ()
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Second, () solves (A3) when () =  By the denition of () we have
that
0() = 	()0(())
To nd 0(()) we recall the mixed strategy (A2) and dierentiate it with
respect to  :
1 = (  1)(() ) [()]20()
Replacing  with  we obtain
0() =
1
(  1)(() ) [()]2 

Substituting, we thus nd that
0() = (  1)(() ) [(())]2 	()
Note also that () = 1 (1   ()) = 1(0) = 0 Hence, when () = 
() solves (A3). Third, if |() | is small, then () induces approxi-
mately the same distribution of advertising as does  This result is based on
the rst and second result. The function () induces  by the rst result,
and () approximates () when () approaches  by the second result: for
any "  0 there exists '  0 such that if |() |  ' for all   [ ] then
|()()|  " As () becomes closer to a constant  the type  becomes
less payo-relevant. Hence, the distribution of advertising induced by ()
prob( | ()  )  approximates  when the payo relevance of types  gets
small. ¥
7.2 Proof of Proposition 5
Consider part (ii). Note rst that advertising at the top is held xed at
() = 0() = 0 for all  Dierentiating |0 ()| with respect to  yields:
 |0 ()|

= |0()|
μ
1 + (  1) ln[1  ()]
  1
¶

The equation means that for a slight increase of  () becomes atter over
the types above 1(1  ! 11 )  ( ) and steeper over the types below
1(1  ! 11 ) We can next show that advertising at the bottom, ()
strictly increases when  rises. To see this, integrating by parts, we get
() =
Z 

(() )(  1)[1  ()]2	()
= (() ) 
Z 

[1  ()]1
(())
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The integral on the RHS strictly decreases with  and thus () strictly
increases in  Hence, we can now conclude that there exists a cuto typeb  1(1 ! 11 ) such that equilibrium advertising strictly increases with
 for   [b), strictly decreases with  for   (b ), and is constant with
 when   {b }.
Consider part (iv). For the proof, we proceed with four steps as follows.
First, we establish a monotonicity in the ratio of advertising equilibrium slopes
under MLR dominance. Dene
*()  
0
 ()
0()
=
	()
 ()

1  ()
1()
¸2

For   [ ), the ratio *() of two slopes is strictly increasing in  since ()
()
and 1 ()
1() are then positive and strictly increasing under MLR dominance.
The latter term, 1 ()
1()  is strictly increasing if
1 ()
()
 1()
()
 To see that
this inequality holds for   [ ), note that MLR dominance can be re-stated
as ()
(
)
 ()
(
)
for all   ; hence, for   [ ), MLR dominance impliesR 


()
(
)
 
R 


()
(
)
 and thus 1 (
)
(
)
 1(
)
(
)
 Second, we establish that
 ()  () Note that
 ()() = 
Z 

¡
[1  ()]1  [1()]1¢
(())
We thus have that  ()  () if
1 ()
1()  1 for all   . This inequality
holds, since 1 ()
1() achieves its minimum value of 1 at  and (as established
above) is strictly increasing for   [ ) under MLR dominance Third, we
show that *() = ()
()
 1  [()
()
]1 = *(). The stated properties for *()
follow immediately from the denition of *() and MLR dominance, while
the stated properties for *() follow from using L’Hopital’s rule and MLR
dominance. Given  ()  (),  () = () = 0 and *()  1, we can
conclude that there exists e  ( ) at which () crosses  () from above.
Fourth, we establish that a second interior crossing does not exist. Assume to
the contrary that there exists 2  ( ) at which () crosses  () from
below and thus *(2)  1. Given  () = () = 0 and *()  1, there
must then exist 3  (2 ) at which () crosses  () from above and thus
*(3)  1. But this contradicts our rst result that *() is strictly increasing
in  over   [ ) under MLR dominance. ¥
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